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Trading the Privacy Right: Justice Alito’s 
Dangerous Reasoning on Privacy Rights 
Peter A. Meyers1 & Joshua Osborne-Klein2 
 
The primary role of the judiciary is to protect rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.3 This role becomes especially important when such rights 
conflict with majoritarian whim.4  The United States Supreme Court is the 
ultimate authority on interpreting the Bill of Rights and is therefore the 
body responsible for ensuring that individual rights are protected.5 
Accordingly, changes in the composition of the Court can have 
consequences on how our society protects individual rights.   This concern 
crystallized on October 31, 2005, when Samuel A. Alito, Jr., was nominated 
by President George W. Bush as an associate justice on the Supreme Court.6 
Alito was confirmed by the United States Senate on January 31, 2006, thus 
becoming the 110th Supreme Court justice.7 Alito replaced retiring Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, who was often the critical “swing vote” on the 
Court.8  
During his confirmation hearing, Alito expressly recognized the role of 
the judiciary as protector of individual rights.   He explained as follows: 
there’s a reason why they gave federal judges life tenure, and that 
is so . . . they will not decide cases based on the way the wind is 
blowing at a particular time . . . when people may lose sight of 
fundamental rights, the judiciary stands up for fundamental rights; 
that it is not reluctant to stand up for the unpopular and for what 
the court termed insular minorities; that the judiciary . . . enforces 
the Constitution and laws in a steadfast way . . . .9 
However, as it stands now, Justice Alito “has never taken a position more 
receptive to individual privacy or security than the position taken by his 
colleagues on the same panel.”10  Indeed, despite his rhetoric during his 
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confirmation hearing, Justice Alito’s opinions as a judge for the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals11 illustrate a willingness to dilute individual rights.   
Moreover, these opinions serve as indicators of how he will likely analyze 
individual rights cases as a Supreme Court justice.12 
As a justice, Alito will have ample opportunity to further shape the right 
to privacy.  He will likely rule on privacy cases with issues concerning 
abortion,13 gay marriage,14 torture,15 and warrantless electronic 
eavesdropping,16 among others.  The constitutional jurisprudence in these 
cases will invariably require Justice Alito and the other members of the 
Court to balance the individual interest in privacy against the broader 
governmental interests of efficient law enforcement and preservation of the 
health and safety of the people.  
Alito’s career, however, has almost always focused on advocating in 
favor of broad governmental interests that often contravene interests in 
personal privacy.  Before becoming a judge, Alito represented the federal 
government as assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States and in 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.17  Just before being 
elevated to the federal bench, Justice Alito was the U.S. Attorney for New 
Jersey, where he was best known for prosecuting white-collar, 
environmental, drug trafficking, and organized crime.18  As a government 
lawyer, Alito has not argued for more liberal privacy rights.19  This kind of 
career focus has informed his reasoning as a circuit court judge and will 
continue to inform his reasoning as a Supreme Court justice. 
In this article, we attempt to determine how Justice Alito will influence 
the Supreme Court’s role as protector of individual rights by looking at his 
decisions regarding privacy rights when he was a circuit court judge.  In 
Part I of this article, we explore Justice Alito’s treatment of the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In 
Part II, we analyze cases in which Alito has considered the Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination and the right to 
counsel.  In Part III, we have the opportunity to discuss a Sixth Amendment 
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case in which Justice Alito, as a member of the Court, wrote the dissent.  In 
Part IV of this article we discuss cases in which Justice Alito has 
commented on the broader right to privacy as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.  In Part V, we conclude that our 
examination of Alito’s jurisprudence on the Third Circuit reveals Justice 
Alito’s willingness to sacrifice individual rights in order to achieve broad 
societal goals.  Thus, we predict that he will weaken the Supreme Court’s 
ability to protect individual rights, thereby ameliorating the Supreme 
Court’s role as the protector of the interests of individuals.  With Justice 
Alito now on the bench, there will be no relief for individuals seeking to 
protect their privacy interests.  
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment is one of the most important components of the 
right to privacy.  It provides to people the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and requires warrants to be based “upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”20  The rights afforded by 
the Fourth Amendment are unquestionably fundamental; however, these 
rights often conflict with the governmental interest in efficient law 
enforcement. Unfortunately, because of the ambiguous wording of the 
Fourth Amendment, judges have considerable discretion in determining 
what police conduct is “unreasonable” and when a warrant affidavit is 
sufficiently “particularized.”  Justice Alito will take advantage of these 
ambiguities to weaken the individual rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment and promote the majoritarian interest in efficient law 
enforcement. 
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A.  Justice Alito Will Weaken the Fourth Amendment by Broadly 
Interpreting the Scope of Search Warrants So As To Justify Questionable 
Law Enforcement Practices.  
Interpretation of the scope and adequacy of search warrants is a topic in 
which the malleable Fourth Amendment standard is subject to exploitation. 
Justice Alito has strained logic to interpret search warrants in ways that 
justify questionable searches.  For example, in United States v. Stiver, Alito 
considered whether the police could answer a telephone in a private 
residence while they were conducting a search of the residence pursuant to a 
warrant.21  The search warrant in Stiver authorized the police to search for 
and seize “all drug paraphernalia.”22  Alito concluded that the “search” of 
incoming telephone calls was authorized under this provision of the warrant 
because the telephone constituted “paraphernalia.”  Alito reasoned as 
follows: 
In ordinary usage, the term “paraphernalia” is defined to mean 
“equipment [and] apparatus . . . used in or necessary for a 
particular activity” . . . .  In light of the fact that the officers had 
ample cause to believe that the defendant had been using the 
apartment to make heroin sales, including sales to individuals who 
wanted the drug for personal use, the officers had an entirely 
reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant’s telephone was 
a piece of “equipment” or “apparatus” that was “used in or 
necessary for [the defendant’s] particular activity,” namely selling 
drugs to users and others from his residence.23 
At a minimum, it is hypertechnical to define the term “paraphernalia” to 
include a telephone used to make drug deals.  Even the federal government, 
which has a critical interest in efficient law enforcement, admits that the 
ordinary usage of the term “drug paraphernalia” is more limited.24  The 
Stiver decision illustrates Justice Alito’s willingness to contort the plain 
language of a warrant so that it satisfies the Fourth Amendment requirement 
of “particularity.”25 
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Justice Alito’s dissent in Baker v. Monroe Township26 exemplifies an 
even more dubious interpretation of a search warrant in favor of law 
enforcement interests.  Specifically, Alito strained logic to justify a search 
that had all the markings of excessiveness.  In Baker, a father and mother, 
accompanied by their two minor children, were on their way to their adult 
child’s apartment for dinner.27  As the Bakers approached the apartment, 
several officers began a drug raid on the same apartment, ordered the family 
to “get down,” held the family at gun point, left the family handcuffed for 
twenty-five minutes, and searched both Mrs. Baker and her minor son.28  
The drug raid was authorized by a form warrant that “contained only an 
identification of the premises to be searched and mentioned nothing about 
any persons” because “no one ever bothered to complete [the warrant] to 
include specified persons as well as premises.”29  In dissent, Alito attempted 
to interpret the flawed warrant so as to justify the search of the family 
members:  
[The search warrant] commanded Armstrong and other defendants 
“to search the (x) premises described below (x) person(s) described 
below (x) vehicle described below. . . . [A]n apartment located in 
an apartment building at 607 South Main Street . . . .” To my mind, 
by far the best interpretation of these provisions of the warrant is 
that they authorized a search of, not only the premises of the 
apartment, but also any persons found on the premises. . . . Since 
paragraph 4 is supposed to describe “premises,” “persons,” and 
“vehicles,” but expressly refers only to the premises of the 
apartment, the most reasonable interpretation is that the warrant 
authorized a search of the premises and any persons or vehicles 
found on the premises.30 
The majority in Baker, authored by Senior Circuit Judge Gibson, directly 
criticized Alito’s reasoning: 
The dissent engages in a lengthy interpretation of the warrant to 
find authorization for a search of persons found on the premises….  
This elaborate interpretation and analysis and the length to which 
the dissent goes in developing it simply point up the inadequacy of 
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the warrant to describe any person generally or specifically. 
Having said as much, we need not speculate further as to whether 
the dissent’s interpretation would cover not only persons found on 
the premises, but those outside the premises and on the sidewalk 
and steps leading into it. It is also evidence that the dissent makes 
its interpretation and bases its analysis on the facts taken in the 
light most favorable to the party moving for summary judgment 
rather than the non-movant, contrary to the constraints we have 
referred to that guide us in reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment.31 
Alito’s dissent in Baker and the majority opinion in Stiver are examples of 
his willingness to reach beyond common sense in interpreting a search 
warrant to justify an expansion of law enforcement power at the expense of 
individual liberty.  
Further limiting the individual’s right to privacy in favor of law 
enforcement interests, Alito has argued for limiting the role of the 
magistrate in the search warrant process.  For example, in United States v. 
Hodge, police arrested Hodge on the street after he discarded two bags of 
crack cocaine while fleeing from the police.32  Subsequent to the arrest, the 
police sought a warrant to search Hodge’s home.33  In the affidavit, an 
officer averred that “the quantity of cocaine involved in [Hodge’s] 
attempted transaction and the circumstances surrounding his arrest indicated 
that Hodge was possessing the crack cocaine with an intent to distribute 
it.”34  The officer claimed that “[b]ased upon [his] training and experience,” 
he knew that “persons involved in the receipt and distribution of controlled 
substances commonly keep within their residences evidence of their 
criminal activity.”35  In considering whether this affidavit was sufficient to 
support probable cause, Alito admitted that there was “no direct evidence 
that drugs or drug paraphernalia would be located in Hodge’s home.”36  
Nevertheless, Alito stretched the understanding of probable cause to uphold 
the validity of the warrant based on deference to police expertise of drug-
dealer activities:  
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Initially, the facts surrounding Hodge’s arrest suggest that he was 
an experienced drug dealer who was operating a drug business. . . . 
All these facts combine to suggest that Hodge was an experienced 
and repeat drug dealer who would need to store evidence of his 
illicit activities somewhere. . . . It is reasonable to infer that a 
person involved in drug dealing on such a scale would store 
evidence of that dealing at his home.37  
This reliance on law enforcement “expertise” to establish probable cause 
in the absence of direct evidence gives substantial power to law 
enforcement agents to obtain warrants without the normal judicial oversight 
required by the Fourth Amendment. 
Alito applied the same dangerous reasoning in his dissent in United 
States v. Zimmerman.38  In Zimmerman, the police searched the defendant’s 
house pursuant to a warrant and found several images of child 
pornography.39  The majority held that the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause because the warrant application “did not contain any 
information indicating that Zimmerman ever possessed child pornography.” 
Furthermore, the only evidence that the defendant possessed adult 
pornography was one clip of adult pornography allegedly obtained several 
months before the search, and thus was stale.40  
Alito dissented, arguing the affidavit supporting the search warrant 
established probable cause.  The affidavit stated that the officer “had been 
informed by a postal inspector with lengthy experience investigating crimes 
involving the sexual victimization of minors that persons with a sexual 
interest in children often collect and keep sexually related images of minors 
for lengthy periods and often use pornography depicting adults to assist in 
victimizing minors.”41  Thus, Alito argued that probable cause was 
established by evidence of “incidents alleged in the affidavit show[ing] that 
the defendant had a sexual interest in minors and that he had used sexual 
materials . . . as part of his course of conduct.”42  Accordingly, as in the 
Hodge majority, Alito’s dissent in Zimmerman relied on generalized notions 
of criminal conduct as explained by law enforcement agents—not 
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particularized suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment—to argue 
that a search warrant was supported by probable cause.  Such reasoning is 
contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to which Alito has paid only 
lip service.43  
B.  Alito Will Likely Expand the Circumstances In Which Warrantless 
Searches and Seizures Are Permitted Under the Fourth Amendment. 
In addition to broadly construing the scope of search warrants, Alito has 
broadened the circumstances in which warrantless searches and seizures are 
allowed.  For example, in United States v. Kithcart, Justice Alito considered 
whether police were justified in stopping an automobile and then arresting 
and searching the occupants without a warrant.44  In Kithcart, an officer 
received three reports of an armed robbery within an hour.45  The reports 
described the alleged perpetrators as “two black males in a black sports car 
…possible Camaro.”46  Approximately ten minutes after receiving the final 
report, near the sites of the robberies, the officer stopped a black Nissan that 
appeared to contain a single African-American male.47  After stopping the 
car, the officer observed Kithcart, a second African-American male 
occupant.48  When Kithcart challenged the stop, the district court ruled that 
the police had probable cause based on the direction, timing, location, and 
description of the vehicle.49  The district court noted the discrepancy in the 
number of occupants in the vehicle but reasoned that because the officer had 
not seen any other African-American men driving cars since the robbery, 
the stop was reasonable.50 
To his credit, Justice Alito disagreed with the district court’s holding that 
the stop was based on probable cause.  Alito held that  
the mere fact that Kithcart is black and that the perpetrators had 
been described as two black males is plainly insufficient. . . . 
[A]rmed with information that two black males driving a black 
sports car were believed to have committed three robberies in the 
area some relatively short time earlier, [the officer] could not 
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justifiably arrest any African-American man who happened to 
drive by in any type of black sports car.51   
However, despite rejecting the use of racial profiling as a way to establish 
probable cause, Alito remanded for a determination of whether the officer 
“had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant an investigative stop” 
under Terry v. Ohio.52  This holding sparked dissent by Judge McKee, who 
would have ruled as a matter of law that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle “solely because it was a black sports car driven 
by an African American male near Bristol Township shortly after she 
learned that two African American males had committed a series of armed 
robberies in that area.”53  This contrast of opinion illustrates, at a minimum, 
Justice Alito’s willingness to accept “racial profiling” as a reasonable basis 
for a Terry stop.  Such an interpretation of reasonableness is a threat to 
protection of minority rights.  
Similarly, in Mellot v. Heemer,54 Justice Alito stretched logic to affirm 
that a seizure conducted by police was reasonable even though it amounted 
to a gross violation of the Fourth Amendment.  In Mellott, one of the 
plaintiffs asserted that he had been seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when police used him as a “human shield” by making him 
walk into a residence in a “potentially dangerous situation” with a gun 
pressed to the plaintiff’s back.55  This case was an appeal of summary 
judgment for defendants, so the court should have viewed the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.56  Despite the deferential standard, 
Alito affirmed the summary judgment for defendants “because the evidence 
in the summary judgment record cannot support a finding that the plaintiff 
Jackie Wright was seized or that a reasonable officer could not have 
believed that Wright was not seized.”57  In reaching this conclusion, Alito 
noted the following: 
There is no evidence that the marshals told [the plaintiff] that he 
was not free to leave.  Moreover, Wright did not state during the 
deposition that he ever told the marshals that he wished to leave or 
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to remain outside Kirk’s house.  Nor did he testify that the 
marshals ever told him that he was not free to leave or to stay 
outside the house.58  
Thus, disregarding the fact that, according to the complaint, the plaintiff 
was forced to enter into a potentially dangerous situation with a gun placed 
to his back, Alito held that “the summary judgment record is insufficient to 
convince a reasonable fact finder that a reasonable person in Wright’s 
position would have felt that he was not free to leave the scene or to stay 
outside the house.”59  Commenting on the evidence that the plaintiff was 
forced into the house at gunpoint, Alito stated that because the plaintiff was 
“in the lead and with the marshals following close behind with their guns 
drawn, it would not be surprising for Wright to feel a gun touch his back.”60  
This conclusion not only disregards the deferential standard appropriate 
when reviewing appeals of summary judgments, it also simply departs from 
rationality.  It is highly questionable that any individual would “feel free to 
leave” when he is being held at gunpoint by police.  Indeed, such police 
conduct would seem to constitute a quintessential seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
C.  Justice Alito Has Broadly Interpreted Exceptions to the Warrant 
Requirement and Limited Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations. 
Justice Alito has attacked the Fourth Amendment from both ends.  While 
broadly interpreting what constitutes a “reasonable” search and seizure in 
cases such as Mellott, discussed above, Alito has simultaneously expanded 
the exceptions to the warrant requirement and limited remedies available for 
Fourth Amendment violations.  For example, in Bolden v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,61 one of Justice Alito’s early 
opinions for the Third Circuit, he broadened the circumstances in which a 
third party may consent to a warrantless search.  In Bolden, the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority appealed an award of 
compensatory damages to Russell Bolden based on an unconstitutional drug 
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test that resulted in Bolden’s discharge from employment.62  Alito noted 
that “compulsory, suspicionless drug testing of a person holding Bolden’s 
job” would violate the Fourth Amendment.63  However, adopting a novel 
concept of the consent exception, Alito found that Bolden had impliedly 
consented to the drug testing by his membership in the union. Alito held 
that 
there are a variety of circumstances in which a third party may 
validly consent to a search or seizure . . . .  [W]e believe that a 
union such as Bolden’s may validly consent to terms and 
conditions of employment, such as submission to drug testing, that 
implicate employees’ Fourth Amendment rights.64  
Thus, Alito articulated a new rule for consent in the Third Circuit: “[I]f 
the union agrees, or if binding arbitration establishes, that the collective 
bargaining agreement impliedly authorizes drug testing, individual 
employees are bound by this interpretation unless they can show a breach of 
the duty of fair representation.”65  In so holding, Alito noted that “no court 
has held that the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be 
negotiated away . . . .”66  
Alito’s decision in Bolden implying that a union member could trade 
away a right, was not without controversy.  In dissent, Judge Nygaard 
criticized Alito’s majority, arguing that the reasoning “confuses the 
distinction between a reasonable and an unreasonable search or seizure.”67  
Nygaard would have held that Bolden could not “have delegated complete 
authority to compromise a right that is the very touch-stone of the Bill of 
Rights and consecrated by generations of constitutional jurisprudence.”68  In 
criticizing the majority, Nygaard hits close to home by identifying a 
recurring theme in Alito’s reasoning:  
The majority seems to believe that the scope and nature of Fourth 
Amendment rights would depend on the legal framework of labor 
law . . . .  I reject that importation into Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The contours of the Fourth Amendment cannot be 
molded by a union to its utilitarian concept of fairness.69  
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Further hammering on this point, Nygaard explained the following: 
Fourth Amendment rights are guaranteed to individuals.  Unions 
do not have inherent actual authority to waive such constitutional 
rights; else individual rights would be sacrificed for some 
perceived collective good as unions negotiate to get economically 
related benefits for their members as a whole.  The Bill of Rights is 
predicated on the notion that minority or individual rights must be 
protected from assault by the majority.”70 
Thus, as alluded to by Judge Nygaard in this articulate dissent, Alito’s 
decision in Bolden offered early warning that Alito may not be committed 
to protection of individual rights, especially in the realm of Fourth 
Amendment privacy.  
Alito also broadened the consent exception’s application in the context of 
electronic eavesdropping.  For example, in United States v. Lee, a defendant 
argued that a videotape showing the defendant illegally receiving money 
from a confidential police informant should have been suppressed under the 
Fourth Amendment.71  The videotape was obtained by FBI agents who 
electronically monitored and recorded activities in the defendant’s hotel 
room using equipment installed in the room by the FBI.72  The agents did 
not have a warrant for the surveillance; rather, they relied on consent of the 
confidential informant.73  Thus, the agents were instructed to use the 
monitoring equipment only when the informant was in the defendant’s 
room.74  Alito held that the video surveillance did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, despite the absence of a warrant, because “[t]here was no 
evidence that conversations were monitored when [the informant] was 
absent [and] . . . the tapes do not depict anything material that [the 
informant] himself was not in a position to hear or see while in the room.”75  
The dissent in Lee rejected this reasoning, relying largely on Supreme 
Court indications in Katz v. United States76 that “self-imposed restraint” by 
law enforcement agents “could not legitimize the warrantless seizure of 
Katz’s conversations in the public telephone booth.”77  Indeed, it appears 
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that the Katz opinion expressly rejects the argument upon which Alito relied 
in the Lee majority opinion.  In Katz, the Supreme Court noted the 
following: 
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint.  Yet 
the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents 
themselves, not by a judicial officer.  They were not required, 
before commencing the search, to present their estimate of 
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.  They 
were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to 
observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court 
order.  Nor were they directed, after the search had been 
completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that 
had been seized.  In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has 
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers 
reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and 
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means 
consistent with that end.78 
Accordingly, the dissent in Lee argued that Alito erred because, while the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect information voluntarily confided to an 
informant, in things outside an informant’s perception there remains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.79  Thus, noting that the surveillance 
equipment continued to transmit images when the informant was not in the 
room and the equipment had a different line of sight than that of the 
informant, the dissent would have held that the FBI agents’ self-restraint 
was an insufficient safeguard under Katz and, therefore, the videotape 
should have been suppressed. Noting Alito’s departure from the Katz 
decision, Judge McKee characterized Alito’s Lee opinion as “gulp[ing] 
down the Fourth Amendment . . . .”80  
Justice Alito will find partnership on the Supreme Court in his quest to 
disparage the Fourth Amendment.  In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court, with 
newly minted Justice Alito on it, faced the question of whether the 
exclusionary remedy is triggered by a violation of the “knock-and-
announce” rule, which requires officers to knock-and-announce their 
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presence and wait a reasonable time before forcibly entering a private 
residence.81  The Hudson majority ruled that the exclusionary remedy is not 
an available remedy for such a violation.82 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority largely ignored the individual 
interests that the knock-and-announce rule was designed to protect.  Justice 
Scalia, writing for a majority composed of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, recited three historical purposes for 
the knock-and-announce rule: (1) protection of human life and limb, (2) 
protection of property, and (3) protection of individual privacy by giving a 
resident “the opportunity to collect oneself before answering the door.”83  
Despite recognizing these interests, the Court found that other remedies— 
such as civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, internal discipline of law 
enforcement officers, and citizen review—served as sufficient deterrence 
for knock-and-announce violations.84  Considering these available 
deterrents, the majority reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule to 
knock-and-announce violations was unjustified because the “substantial 
social costs” that affect “truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives” 
outweighed any benefit to the individual rights served by the rule.85   
This deemphasis of individual liberty did not go unnoticed by Justice 
Breyer, who, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, wrote a 
vigorous dissent.  Noting inconsistency with prior application of the 
exclusionary rule, Justice Breyer argued that the majority opinion 
“represents a significant departure from the Court’s precedents” and 
“weakens, perhaps destroys, much of the practical value of the 
Constitution’s knock-and-announce protection.”86  Justice Breyer relied on 
Mapp v. Ohio,87 in which the Court reversed its prior decision in Wolf v. 
Colorado88 and held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states 
because the other remedies the states had devised to address Fourth 
Amendment violations had proved “worthless and futile.”89  In Justice 
Breyer’s opinion, the majority’s analysis was flawed because it had offered 
no proof that these same types of remedies are any less futile today than 
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they were when Mapp was decided.90  Justice Breyer charged the majority 
with arguing that “Wolf, not Mapp, is now the law.”91 
Justice Breyer also discussed the majority’s willingness to sacrifice 
individual liberties to promote efficient law enforcement.  While conceding 
that there are social costs associated with the exclusion of evidence, Justice 
Breyer aptly pointed out that these same social costs “accompany any use of 
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary principle . . . .”92  Thus, Justice 
Breyer accused the majority of bringing an assault “against the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary principle itself.”93  This condemnation of the 
majority’s opinion is consistent with critiques of Justice Alito’s Third 
Circuit jurisprudence.94  Accordingly, Hudson serves as an indication that 
Justice Alito will continue in his quest of emphasizing law enforcement 
concerns to the detriment of individual liberty.  
In addition to marginalizing the individual interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment by broadening the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, Alito has expanded the qualified immunity doctrine, which 
limits remedies available for Fourth Amendment violations.  Qualified 
immunity bars lawsuits against individual police officers for violations of 
the Fourth Amendment so long as “‘reasonable officials in the defendants’ 
position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the 
decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful.’”95  In Leveto v. 
Lapina, the Third Circuit considered a section 1983 claim96 arising out of a 
Terry-style frisk97 of the wife of a doctor targeted by the IRS for 
investigation.98  The wife was frisked in her home while she was “wearing 
only a nightgown.”99  Alito recognized that a Terry frisk is only permitted 
“when, under the circumstances, an officer has a reasonable belief that the 
subject is armed and dangerous.”100  Thus, Alito held that the frisk of the 
wife violated the Fourth Amendment because “under Ybarra her presence 
on the premises was not alone sufficient to justify the pat down.”101  
 However, while finding a Fourth Amendment violation, Alito held that 
the qualified immunity doctrine barred the Levetos’ section 1983 claim, 
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thus denying any relief for this constitutional violation.102  Alito reasoned 
that “a reasonable agent could have believed that patting down Mrs. Leveto 
. . . was permitted by the Fourth Amendment.”103  Thus, although (1) Mrs. 
Leveto was only connected to criminal activity through her husband, (2) 
there was no indication that her husband “was armed or that he even owned 
any firearms,”104 and (3) Mrs. Leveto was wearing only a nightgown when 
she was frisked in her home, Alito held that the law enforcement agents 
could have reasonably believed that the frisk was permissible.  Alito’s only 
justification for this holding was that “some of the lower court cases 
decided after Ybarra indicated a willingness to allow a frisk provided the 
person had a somewhat stronger link to the premises than Ybarra did to the 
bar where he was found.”105  However, Alito does not cite a single case 
contravening the well-settled rule that officers need a reasonable suspicion 
that Mrs. Leveto was armed and dangerous before conducting a Terry-style 
frisk.106  Only in James Bonds’ world, with a femme fatale like Pussy 
Galore, would such a conclusion be reasonable.107  
Alito’s dissent in Doe v. Groody,108 one of his most controversial 
opinions, further illustrates Alito’s quest to limit remedies for Fourth 
Amendment violations by giving expansive scope to the qualified immunity 
doctrine.  In Doe, police officers were accused of illegally strip searching 
the plaintiffs, one of whom was a ten-year-old girl at the time of the 
search.109  The officers argued that the strip searches were authorized by a 
search warrant; however, Judge Chertoff, writing for the majority, noted 
that the warrant did not list either plaintiff as persons to be searched.110  The 
officers attempted to justify their departure from the warrant by arguing that 
the warrant should be read in light of an accompanying affidavit that 
requested permission to search “all occupants” of the residence.111  Chertoff 
rejected this argument, holding that while “it is perfectly appropriate to 
construe a warrant in light of an accompanying affidavit,” the law is clearly 
established that “the warrant must expressly incorporate the affidavit . . . 
.”112  The majority noted that “[w]ere we to adopt the officers’ approach to 
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warrant interpretation, and allow an unincorporated affidavit to expand the 
authorization of the warrant, we would come dangerously close to 
displacing the critical role of the independent magistrate.”113  
Alito, dissenting, would have held that the officers who conducted the 
warrantless strip search of the ten-year-old plaintiff were entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Alito accused the majority of “employ[ing] a technical 
and legalistic method of interpretation that is the antithesis of the 
‘commonsense and realistic’ approach that is appropriate.”114  Alito 
reasoned that because “the face of the warrant [did] not unambiguously 
restrict the persons to be searched,” the court should hold “that the warrant 
did in fact authorize a search of all persons on the premises . . . .”115  Alito 
further reasoned that even if the warrant did not authorize a search of the 
girl, “a reasonable officer certainly could have believed that it did,” and, 
therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.116 
 Overall, Justice Alito’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence exhibits some 
disturbing trends for those who hold personal privacy as sacrosanct.  Cases 
such as Stiver and Baker illustrate Justice Alito’s willingness to stretch the 
scope of warrants through legal reasoning to justify highly suspect law 
enforcement activities.  As demonstrated in Hodge and the Zimmerman 
dissents, Alito would further weaken the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment by allowing magistrates to defer to law enforcement expertise 
in issuing warrants, thereby reducing the role of the judiciary as a 
gatekeeper of Fourth Amendment rights.  In addition, by broadly construing 
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, Alito will render Fourth Amendment protections largely illusory.  
Already, in Bolden and Lee, Alito has expanded the circumstances in which 
a third party may consent to a warrantless search.  In addition, in Leveto and 
Doe, Alito departed from settled jurisprudence in arguing for qualified 
immunity for officers who violate clearly established Fourth Amendment 
principles.  All of these cases indicate that while serving on the Supreme 
Court, Justice Alito will endeavor to shift the balance in Fourth Amendment 
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jurisprudence in favor of law enforcement goals—a broad societal 
interest—while limiting individual liberty, which is an interest of the 
minority.  
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT  
The Fifth Amendment is also a major component in the right to privacy. 
It protects a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”117  This right to be free from self-incrimination 
has become so important to the individual’s protection and to the truth-
seeking function of the court that police now give a warning to suspected 
criminal defendants of this right to remain silent.118  The Miranda warning, 
of course, alerts a suspected criminal defendant to his right to remain silent 
and to the fact that anything he says can be used against him.  It also alerts 
him to his right to consult with an attorney and to have his attorney present 
during questioning.119  Ideally, the warning is designed as a prophylactic to 
safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but the 
right can be waived.120  The warning should prevent police violations of the 
suspect’s right to be free from implicating himself in a crime through what 
he might be forced to say, because he has just been told that he is free to say 
nothing.  
Justice Alito has addressed these aspects of the Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent in a handful of cases. These cases reveal that, as a justice, he 
will weaken the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, 
he will seek to restrict the prophylactic usefulness of Miranda warnings, 
and he will lower the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel in 
“right to remain silent” cases. 
A.  Justice Alito Will Weaken the Fifth Amendment Right To Be Free from 
Self-Incrimination. 
The right to remain silent is a quintessential expression of the privacy 
right.  To keep private the contents of one’s mind is reflected in the Fifth 
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Amendment’s right to be free from self-incrimination.121  The rationale for 
honoring this right is to avoid coercion.  If a criminal defendant in custody 
is coerced into making a “confession,” then unreliable confessions will 
inevitably result; it would therefore be forever uncertain whether the 
defendant’s will was overborne through the coercion and whether the 
defendant was speaking the truth when he “confessed.”122  Thus, the Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, served by the 
prophylactic Miranda rule, uses the privacy right to advance the truth-
seeking process as well as to protect the individual should they be coerced.  
After indictment, the right to assistance of counsel attaches and any 
incriminating statements made in the absence of counsel are excluded from 
evidence;123 the assumption being, of course, that if a defendant confesses 
with his or her attorney’s advice, it will not be involuntary or coerced. 
Then-Judge Alito eroded the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in 
U.S. v. Balter.124  Although the issue was the use of the defendant’s silence 
after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings for impeachment 
purposes,125 Alito commented on the length of such exercise of the right to 
remain silent.126  In Balter, the police gave the defendant, DeJesus, his 
Miranda warnings.  At first, DeJesus gave only routine biographical 
information but did not comment on his alleged offenses.127  Two days later, 
he telephoned the arresting officer and tried to make a deal, using a story 
that made himself the driver but not the triggerman for the alleged crime.128  
Alito thought that two days of silence by DeJesus could be justified by 
DeJesus’ reliance on the belief, engendered by the warnings, that his silence 
could not be used against him.129  Even so, Alito concluded that even if the 
prosecution was in error when it commented on DeJesus’ post-arrest silence 
for the purpose of impeaching a subsequent exculpatory statement in its 
case in chief, it was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence 
admitted against DeJesus at trial.130  
However, in dicta, Alito went further and noted that “[i]t may be that a 
defendant’s silence immediately after receiving Miranda warnings is more 
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likely to represent the exercise of Miranda rights than is a defendant’s 
silence for an extended period after the receipt of warnings.”131  Bear in 
mind that the use of a defendant’s silence—at the time of arrest and after 
receiving Miranda warnings—violates the Due Process clause when used 
for impeachment purposes.132  Thus, by opening the door to allowing 
prosecutors to make such comments on silences longer than two days, Alito 
is narrowing the scope of the Fifth Amendment right in a way quite 
unexpected by the nature of the right itself.  According to Alito, the longer 
one exercises the right to remain silent, the more likely one is to have that 
silence used against him or her.  This analysis chisels apart the privacy right 
in the Fifth Amendment by making it more costly to exercise the right when 
one needs it the most.  A defendant exercising this Fifth Amendment right 
for an extended period of time before reaching Justice Alito’s court will 
need a strong argument, because his or her silence will be held to a higher 
standard.133  Such Fifth Amendment dictum illustrates, again, Justice Alito’s 
bias in favor of law enforcement institutions over individual privacy 
interests. 
Alito’s decision in Reardon v. Hendricks134 also illustrates that he 
upholds institutional preferences over individual rights.  In Reardon, Alito 
applied the voluntariness standard of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte135 to an 
alcoholic who traded his confession for a bottle of gin.136  The Schneckloth 
Court adopted a totality of the circumstances approach to determine 
whether the defendant’s confession was the product of interrogation that 
had overborne the defendant’s will.137  All Alito could say regarding the 
voluntariness of the alcoholic’s confession was that “clearly established law 
forecloses us from assigning controlling weight to Reardon’s 
alcoholism.”138  Alito did not discuss whether other factors, in combination 
with alcoholism, might have justified a contrary holding if the totality of the 
circumstances had been examined, rather than the single factor of the 
defendant’s alcoholism.  This illustrates again that Justice Alito will not 
   Trading the Privacy Right 393 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
move the Court toward broader interpretation of individual rights when it 
comes to individual rights.   
B.  Justice Alito Will Seek To Restrict the Prophylactic Usefulness of 
Miranda Warnings by Rejecting the Use of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
Doctrine . 
 The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, growing out of the Fourth 
Amendment, limits the admissibility of any governmental evidence that has 
been gained by an illegal search or seizure, among other things.  To have 
the evidence admitted, the government must argue that the causal 
relationship between the primary illegality and the evidence obtained 
thereby is so attenuated as to purge the latter of the taint.  As the Supreme 
Court began importing the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine into Fifth 
Amendment analysis as applied to statements, some defendants argued that 
the doctrine should be applied when earlier, unwarned statements tainted 
later statements such that the later statements were “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” as well and should be excluded from evidence.139  This was known as 
the “cat out of the bag” theory.140 
In U.S. v. Tyler, then-judge Alito concurred with the majority of a Third 
Circuit panel, which voted to expand the type of Miranda violation it will 
consider when deciding the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine in the Sixth141 Amendment context.142  In Tyler, a Mirandized 
defendant initially refused to make a statement.143  A short time later, he 
was taken to a different police station and a police officer engaged him in 
discussion.144 Following this reinitiation, less than an hour later the 
defendant began to cry, was re-Mirandized, and made an inculpatory 
statement. 145  Eleven days later, still in custody, the police repeated 
Miranda warnings, Tyler acknowledged them, orally waived his rights, and 
made another inculpatory statement.146  
The issue between Alito and the majority was the analysis that should be 
applied when a prior Miranda violation is alleged to taint a subsequent 
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Mirandized statement.147  In this case, police failed to scrupulously honor a 
defendant’s right to cut off questioning.148  Both the majority and Alito 
agreed that the taint of an unconstitutionally obtained statement may not 
always be attenuated by Miranda warnings. However, Alito took it further, 
pointing out that “the rule is inapplicable when the initial illegality consists 
of a violation of the Miranda prophylactic rule.”149  Apparently, Alito does 
not view the officers’ failure to scrupulously honor a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as the primary problem, but recasts the issue as 
the officers’ failure to scrupulously honor a Miranda invocation.150  He 
reasoned that the violation in Tyler was not a procedural violation, as was at 
issue in Elstad,151 in which the officer neglected to give the warning.  In 
contrast, in Tyler, the officers violated Miranda after the right was 
invoked.152  To Alito, this difference does not appear to matter,153 and 
makes it appear that he denies privacy rights by strictly adhering to 
questionable precedent. 
C.  Justice Alito Will Likely Lower the Safeguards of the Fifth Amendment 
Right to Counsel. 
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a chief safeguard of the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent and is therefore an important protection 
of an individual’s privacy interests.  The Miranda rule requires that once an 
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation, police officers must scrupulously honor that right to cut off 
questioning.154  Unlike the right to remain silent, once the right to counsel is 
invoked, it cannot be waived merely by an accused’s responses to further 
police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if the accused has been re-
Mirandized.155  When an accused has expressed his or her desire to deal 
with officers only through counsel, they cannot be subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
them, unless the accused reinitiates communication with the police.156  
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Justice Alito’s past decisions imply that he would put the burden on the 
defendant to request an attorney for each fresh interrogation, thus 
weakening this constitutional safeguard. For example, in Flamer v. 
Delaware,157 Flamer and another man, both suspected in a double murder 
investigation, blamed each other for the crime.158  The police read Miranda 
warnings to Flamer several times during the interrogation and, each time, he 
waived his right to an attorney.159  Flamer did not request an attorney until 
arraignment.160  After that request, but before actually consulting an 
attorney, Flamer confessed.161  Alito, writing for the court, held that merely 
requesting an attorney at arraignment was insufficient to constitute a request 
for an attorney in connection with future custodial interrogation.162  This 
holding departs from the Supreme Court’s holding in Edwards that police 
may not reengage the defendant in questioning once the defendant has 
requested counsel and until counsel is made available.163  For Alito, 
requesting an attorney at an arraignment or bail hearing is not the same as 
requesting an attorney in connection with future custodial interrogation.164  
Under Flamer, police can simply jail people and play a game of 
reinvocation every time they question an accused.  This contravenes the 
well-established duty to scrupulously observe an accused’s right to 
counsel.165  
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixth Amendment’s counsel clause provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense.166  Cases such as Wheat v. United States and Powell 
v. Alabama established that a defendant who pays for counsel may choose 
who that counsel will be.167 
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A.  Justice Alito Will Make Unworkable Distinctions in the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel. 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, one of the final decisions of the 2005 
term, the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment encompasses the right of 
a criminal defendant to have the counsel of his choice—not merely the 
assistance that such counsel would provide.168  In other words, lawyers are 
not fungible, and a defendant’s choice of counsel is so fundamental to the 
trial process that any wrongful denial of a defendant’s first choice of 
lawyers warrants a per se reversal.169  In the 5-4 decision, with Justice 
Scalia writing for a rare majority that included the four liberal members, the 
Court reasoned that what the Sixth Amendment provides is not that a trial 
be fair,170 but that “a particular guarantee of fairness be provided…that the 
accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”171  Contrary to 
the government’s claim, no showing of prejudice is required; the right is 
violated when counsel is erroneously deprived.172  Such right is part of the 
“root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment.173  Furthermore, such denial is not 
subject to harmless-error analysis, but instead is a structural defect in the 
trial itself.174 
The facts make this clear. A Missouri federal magistrate judge refused to 
allow Gonzalez-Lopez’s first choice of counsel, Attorney Low, to represent 
him on drug-trafficking charges.175  Low, a California lawyer who was 
awaiting pro hac vice admission in Missouri, had improperly passed notes 
to Gonzalez-Lopez’s Missouri lawyer during the evidentiary hearing—a 
violation of a local court rule, according the judge, who barred Low from 
further proceedings in the case.176  Gonzalez-Lopez then hired a St. Louis 
lawyer who subsequently lost his case.177  The Eighth Circuit overturned the 
conviction, ruling that the judge’s improper exclusion of Low amounted to 
a structural defect that warranted automatic reversal of the conviction.178 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito would require a criminal defendant 
to make at least some showing that the trial court’s erroneous ruling 
adversely affected the quality of assistance that the defendant received.179 
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That is because what the Sixth Amendment protects is the “Assistance” that 
such counsel is able to provide; it is not the lawyer, but the lawyering, that 
the Sixth Amendment protects.180  In other words, in Justice Alito’s view, 
lawyers are fungible.  This distinction between the lawyer and the legal 
advice is simply artificial and impractical.  Alito seems to think there is this 
thing out there called “legal advice,” disembodied from the lawyer giving it. 
Although he argues that the text of the Sixth Amendment supports his 
interpretation (“Assistance”),181 it is doubtful that the Framers had such a 
distinction in mind.  The difference between Alito and the majority is that 
Scalia focuses on the autonomy of the defendant to choose whomever he or 
she will choose, whereas Alito focuses on whether the “Assistance” was 
effective—regardless of who provided it—and whether such assistance 
prejudiced the defendant.  Such disrespect of an individual’s choice is not 
surprising when one examines Justice Alito’s other privacy decisions. 
IV. OTHER PRIVACY CASES 
One of the most controversial, yet also most important, individual rights 
is the liberty interest in privacy.  While this right is not expressly conveyed 
in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court identified it and applied it in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.182  Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, 
explained as follows: 
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.  Various guarantees create zones of privacy.  The right 
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment 
is one  . . . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the 
quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without 
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.  The Fourth 
Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.  
398 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
JUSTICE ALITO AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”183 
Thus, privacy is a liberty implied by the express rights guaranteed in the 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  This liberty interest is 
protected through the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.184 
A.  Justice Alito’s Decisions Imply He Will Weaken the Privacy Right 
Regarding Women’s Reproductive Rights. 
The right of a woman to elect to undergo an abortion is founded on the 
right to privacy.185  The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,186 stated that there 
is a fundamental right to privacy that includes “the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusions into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.”187  This right to privacy, a protected liberty interest, is 
“broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy.”188  Thus, if the right of a woman to elect an abortion is picked 
apart, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the right to privacy is further 
eroded as well.  Justice Alito’s previous treatment of reproductive rights 
serves as a strong indicator that he will favor institutional interests over the 
individual liberty interest in privacy.  
Justice Alito never wrote the majority opinion in the three reproductive-
rights cases he heard while on the Third Circuit.189  His concurring 
argument in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey190 
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court on review.191  Since then, 
however, Alito concurred in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. 
Farmer,192 in which the Third Circuit, following Casey, affirmed that a state 
statute regulating partial-birth abortion is unconstitutional because it 
constitutes an undue burden if it lacks an exception for performing an 
abortion to preserve the health of the mother.193  Alito concurred only in the 
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result; he would have held that the case was entirely controlled by Stenberg 
v. Carhart,194 which decided the constitutionality of a similar Nebraska 
statute and thus did not require the analysis in which the majority 
engaged.195  These opinions further demonstrate Justice Alito’s willingness 
to forego individual privacy rights in favor of institutional interests. 
B.  Justice Alito Will Restrict Reproductive Privacy Rights by Making the 
Undue Burden Test More Restrictive, Thus Allowing Coercion of a Woman 
into Revealing Private Information in Exchange for an Abortion. 
Justice Alito will restrict reproductive privacy rights by taking advantage 
of the undue burden test’s inherent flexibility and malleability.  Following 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring lead in Hodgson v. Minnesota,196 the Third 
Circuit in Casey applied the rule that if a statute regulating abortion does 
not impose an undue burden, the statute need only meet the rational 
relationship test to pass constitutional muster; otherwise, if there is an 
undue burden, strict scrutiny applies.197  Under this test, the majority held 
that a spousal-notification provision of a state law regulating abortion was 
an undue burden on a woman’s abortion decision and did not serve a 
compelling state interest.198  Justice Alito disagreed on this point, arguing 
that because only a few women suffer from the spousal notification 
provision, the provision is not unduly burdensome to women as a whole.199 
Thus, Alito would have held that the spousal notification provision did not 
impose an undue burden; he would have analyzed the spousal notification 
provision under the rational relationship test,200 and he would have held that 
the provision serves the legitimate interest in furthering the husband’s 
interest in the fetus.201  
The analytical path that Justice Alito traced in his Casey concurrence 
represents an attack on the privacy right.  His reading of Justice O’Connor’s 
abortion decisions led him to conclude that “an undue burden may not be 
established simply by showing that a law will have a heavy impact on a few 
women but that instead a broader inhibiting effect must be shown.”202 
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Alito’s approach was opposite to that of the majority, which centered the 
undue burden analysis on the degree of restriction an affected woman might 
experience, and not on whether the adversely affected group is a small 
fraction of the number of women who might seek an abortion.203 Alito’s 
reverse balancing in Casey implies that he would find a woman’s right to 
privacy outweighed by a husband’s interest in the fetus or a societal interest 
in preventing abortions.204 
The Supreme Court reviewed Casey and affirmed the Third Circuit 
majority’s reasoning.205  The Court held that the proper focus of 
constitutional inquiry was the group for whom the law was a restriction, not 
the group for whom the law was irrelevant.206  Considering the women for 
whom the statute is relevant, the Court held that the spousal notification 
provision would be a substantial obstacle to those women’s choices to 
undergo abortions.207  Thus, Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion 
voiding the spousal-notification provision as being unconstitutional.208  In 
doing so, O’Connor protected an individual woman’s interest in privacy. 
Alito, on the other hand, had argued to diminish the role that coercion might 
have on a woman’s choice to abort, thus ignoring any coercion that 
individuals within a protected group might undergo.  
As in the Fifth Amendment context, Alito’s opinion in Casey illustrates 
that he does not see coercion in this context to be a burden large enough to 
trigger a constitutional violation. Justice Alito pointed out in his Casey 
concurrence that a woman under a spousal-notification regime can have an 
abortion so long as she reveals her private decision to her husband.209  
While a father unquestionably has an interest in his unborn offspring,210 
O’Connor’s plurality recognized that, in certain circumstances, the cost on 
the mother of notifying her spouse might be prohibitive.  Such reasoning 
implies that the spousal notification requirement might have a coercive 
effect on a woman’s right to choose to abort.  Essentially, a pregnant 
woman who does not want to carry to term would be made to pass a 
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gauntlet, where she must offer her privacy right in exchange for passage.  
Once again we see the trading in rights that is an Alito favorite.  
V. CONCLUSION 
If our civilization is to be judged by its treatment of minorities, we should 
be wary of Justice Alito’s confirmation to the Supreme Court.211  The 
Constitution protects privacy through the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
on unreasonable searches and seizures and the warrant requirement, the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of liberty in their due process clauses.  
Our analysis of Justice Alito’s Third Circuit opinions indicates that he will 
weaken the constitutional protection of privacy for individuals in each of 
these areas.  Such erosion of privacy rights represents a shift of the Court’s 
emphasis from individual protections to institutional concerns.   
At the end of a report Alito helped write as a senior at Princeton 
University in 1971, he recognized that “[t]he erosion of privacy, unlike war, 
economic bad times, or domestic unrest, does not jump to the citizen’s 
attention . . . .  But by the time privacy is seriously compromised, it is too 
late to clamor for reform.”212  Ironically, it may be Justice Alito’s 
confirmation onto the Court that finally signals that our right to privacy is 
irreversibly compromised. 
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Amendment.”  A.C.L.U. v. National Security Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006).  The A.C.L.U. court further found that the wiretapping program violated the 
APA, the Separation of Powers doctrine, the First Amendment, and statutory law, and, 
accordingly, permanently enjoined the program.  Id. at 782.  However, the Sixth Circuit 
stayed the injunction pending appeal.  A.C.L.U. v. National Security Agency, 467 F.3d 
590 (6th Cir. Oct 04, 2006). In the second case, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, 
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29 Id. at 1189. 
30 Id. at 1197 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 1189 (majority opinion). 
32 United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 303 (3d Cir. 2001). 
33 Id. at 303-04. 
34 Id. at 304. 
35 Id. at 304-05. 
36 Id. at 306. 
37 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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The comparison of Alito’s analysis in Ninety-Two Thousand with his analysis in both 
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56 See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (“On summary 
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”). 
57 Mellott, 161 F.3d at 124. 
58 Id. at 125. 
59 Id. at 124-25. 
60 Id. 
61 Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1991). 
62 Id. at 809. 
63 Id. at 823. 
64 Id. at 826. 
65 Id. at 828. 
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87 Id. at 2173; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961). 
88 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
89 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652. 
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121 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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149 Id. at 162 (Alito, J., concurring). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
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155  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
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